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Has the China-Europe Freight Train
Become a Winning Run?
By Xiangming Chen
In “China and Europe: Reconnecting across a New Silk Road” (Xiangming Chen and Julie Mardeusz ’16,
The European Financial Review, February/March 2015), we included a short section about the
China-Europe Freight Train (CEFT). The CEFT was then in its fourth year of running, while the Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) was officially only two years old. A total of 815 freight trains ran between
China and Europe in 2015. The pandemic year of 2020 saw 12,406 trains between China and Europe,
with another surge during the first six months of 2021. What has changed over a few short years?
This article addresses this question by examining the scope of the CEFT’s connectivity and its
impact on both ends of a transcontinental rail freight system across Eurasia.

"China and Europe: Reconnecting across a New Silk Road"
https://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/china-and-europe-reconnecting-across-a-new-silk-road/
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I

magine a local resident in the ancient Silk
CONNECTING AND GROWING
Road city of Xi’an in northwestern China enjoying fresh Atlantic salmon from Norway
THROUGH A TRIO OF EURASIAN
in the summer. This is possible now, thanks to
DYADS
the China-Europe Freight Train (CEFT)1, which
When the inaugural CEFT opened up a single
began to ship salmon overland to China in 2020.
route from the megacity of Chongqing in
Leaving Narvik, the northernmost cargo railway
southwestern China to Duisburg, Germany in
yard on the coast of the Norwegian Sea, a freight
2011, through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and
train carrying containers of salmon travels to
Poland, few would have imagined or envisioned
Haparanda on Sweden’s border with Finland,
an extensive transcontinental network of freight
where the containers are switched to Finnish
lines criss-crossing the vast Eurasia today.
wagons. From Kouvola, Finland, the salmon carThese routes had carried 41,008 trains between
go will cross into Russia and then follow the esover 50 Chinese cities and 168 cities across 23
tablished rail cargo route via St Petersburg and
European and Asian counMoscow into Kazakhstan
tries by the middle of
and eastbound, to arrive
The geographical band of the CEFT
2021.3 Miraculous as it is,
in Xi’an in about 10 days.2
This freight connec- signals straight, long-distance
the geographical band of
tion from Arctic Norway
the CEFT signals straight,
to western China is only freight connections between China
long-distance
freight
one line among a rapidly at the eastern end and Europe at
connections
between
growing set of freight the western end of Eurasia. The
China at the eastern end
routes across Eurasia, the
and Europe at the western
world’s oldest and longest actual scope of these freight routes,
end of Eurasia. The actual
route of overland trade however, has extended more broadly scope of these freight
connections, which once
routes,
however,
has
in an untidy and complex pattern.
relied on camels and
extended more broadly
horses, dating back to the
in an untidy and complex
ancient Silk Road or even earlier. Fast-forward
pattern. It has veered off the traditional Eurasian
to the turn of the 20th century, British scholar
land bridge via Central Asia and the TransHalford Mackinder saw the landmass of Eurasia
Siberian Railway via Russia to include routes
as the pivot of global history and influence on
to and through Iran and Turkey. The CEFT has
geopolitical dynamics, at the central location
also created multi-modal and intermodal shipof the planet (Chen and Fazilov 2018). He also
ping routes that stretch its connectivity to East
foresaw trains covering this super-continent
Asia and Southeast Asia. These extended freight
some day, although direct China-Europe freight
connections have turned the CEFT into a trio of
services did not exist up to as recently as 2008
dyadic transport/logistics ties between China(Hillman 2020). Over one short decade since
Europe, Europe-Asia and China-Asia.
2011, the CEFT has grown from 17 trains from
To assess the geographical and economic
China to Europe in 2011 to 7,377 trains heading
importance of freight lines between each of
in both directions in just the first six months of
these three pairs, it is crucial to show the main
2021. Regarding Mackinder’s foresight, it has
contour of the CEFT network. Figure 1 displays
taken a whole century for the CEFT routes to
the main CEFT corridors/channels, eastern,
(re)connect the Eurasian landscape for greater
central and western. The eastern channel links
cross-border trade.
cities in northeastern and eastern China to
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FIGURE 1: THE CHINA-EUROPE FREIGHT TRAIN’S TRAVEL CORRIDORS/CHANNELS

Source: https://www.winskyfreight.com/rail-freight-china-to-europe/.

Russia via the border city of Manzouli, northwest of Harbin. The central channel connects
some northern Chinese cities to Russia via the
border city of Erlianhot, northwest of Beijing in
Inner Mongolia. Both channels meet in Russia
and travel on the Trans-Siberian Railway until
arriving in Moscow, where some trains would
join the western corridor into Europe. The
eastern and central channels align with the
China-Mongolia-Russia corridor of the BRI.
The western corridor brings freight trains from
many of China’s coastal and interior cities to
Europe along the Eurasian Land Bridge from
Lianyungang to Amsterdam, through the cities
of Alashankou and Khorgos on the border with
Kazakhstan. It parallels the BRI’s new Eurasian
Land Bridge corridor. The western corridor
spins off from the south channel, also called the
“middle corridor”, which runs via Almaty along
the BRI’s China-Central Asia-West Asia corridor
(Figure 1).
The western corridor has encompassed the
largest number of specific routes and freight
trains, as shown by the most recent evidence.
In the first half of 2021, the western, central
and eastern channels sent 3,810, 1,285 and 2,282

trains, which accounted for 51.6%, 17.4% and
30.9% of all CEFTs over that period, respectively.
From a spatial matching perspective, the CEFT
and the BRI have converged, with the former
driving the latter to help keep trade flowing
between China and Europe. In addition, these
train runs and trade flows have covered main
parts of Central and West Asia (see Figure 1). Not
shown on this map are extended connections
to East Asia and Southeast Asia, which suggests
that other parts of Asia are now tied into the
CEFT system.
To get a more detailed picture of the freight
connections between China-Europe, China-Asia
and Europe-Asia in the tripartite CEFT system,
Figure 2 organises the regions and cities that
send and receive CEFTs through multiple international boundaries between China’s coast and
Europe’s Atlantic coast. From east to west, corresponding to the rough geographical layout of
a partial world map, zones 1 to 4 identify four
connected regions with subregions that contain
the departure, intermediate and arrival places
for a variety of CEFT routes, and the general
economic features and activities creating and
sustaining these routes (see the bottom row of
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Figure 2). While zone 1 includes three subzones
of China’s earlier and more opened and developed coastal cities, zone 2 refers to three interior
and border regions that have become the most
active and dominant drivers of CEFTs as late
developers and beneficiaries of China’s “Go
West” campaign. Zone 3 consists of three parts
of Asia, by land primarily and sea partially, that
serve as transit zones or final or trans-shipped
destinations. Zone 4 covers three regions further
west, featuring Europe anchoring the other
end of the CEFT system opposite zone 2. It also
includes few West Asian cities, such as Istanbul,
along the less-travelled south channel or middle
corridor (see Figure 1), with North Africa (4C)
much less connected to China by land.
While Figure 2 can reveal and mask numerous
bilateral and trilateral freight routes between

China, Europe and Asia, I use it to highlight
two examples that illustrate the ever-expanding
and extending long lines across a diverse set of
national and subnational areas, with elaborations
in the last section. On 18 August 2020, a freight
train carrying electronic products, consumer
goods and PPEs left the Chinese city of Shenzhen
(subzone 1C, which also refers to the Pearl River
Delta) bordering Hong Kong for Duisburg (see
photo, figure 3). It travelled through 27 other
Chinese cities, including Chengdu (2C), exited at
Alashankou (2A) on 23 August, passed through
Kazakhstan (3A), and finally arrived in Duisburg
(4A) 11 days later, after a journey of 13,438 kilometres.4 Sponsored by the China Merchants
Group (CMG), headquartered in Hong Kong, and
labelled “The Great Bay Express”, this service
sent 262 freight trains to Europe from China’s top

FIGURE 2: THE CHINA-EUROPE FREIGHT TRAIN (CEFT)’S CONNECTED ROUTES ACROSS FOUR INTERNATIONAL REGIONAL ZONES

Zone 4
4A

Zone 3

CEFT

3A
Europe
(Duisburg, Ghent,
Madrid, Budapest)

4B

2A

3B

4C

a. Overland to sea
b. Luxury consumer
products for China
(expensive cars, wine)
c. Large and growing
consumer markets for
Chinese products

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
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Great Bay Area
(Guangzhou, Shenzhen,
Dongguan, Huizhou)

Soutwest Region
(Chengdu, Chongqing)

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Land-locked to sea
Many commodities
Labour supply
Growing manufacturing
Smaller but growing
consumer centers
f. Logistic hubs

Source: Conceived by author.
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Weakening manufacturing
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Source of technology
transfer

FIGURE 3: THE FIRST “GREAT BAY EXPRESS” FREIGHT TRAIN FROM SHENZHEN ARRIVED IN DUISBURG ON SEPTEMBER 4, 2020

Source: China Merchants Group photo; accessed from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/8BldmufNSlQGmV61QFPBcw.

manufacturing region in 2020. This is the second-longest China (2B and 2C) in linking a number of China’s coastal
CEFT line, slightly shorter than the Yiwu-Madrid (1B-4A) export-oriented centres (zone 1) to a large number of
route, covering roughly 13,500 kilometres (Chen 2018).
cities in Central Asia and Europe (3A and 4A). The spatial
The second exemplary route returns a freight train from pattern within China is logically consistent with China’s
Europe (4A) through Kazakhstan (3A) to Chongqing (2C), goal of shifting development priority and opportunities
which on 16 March 2018 sent
from the coastal to the intethe first train south to Hanoi,
rior regions, especially the
Vietnam (3C) via the Chinese The CEFT has created a
western region. The CEFT
border city of Pingxiang, geographically and functionally
has created a geographically
Guangxi Province. This railand functionally favourable
rail route, which reduces favourable opportunity for such
opportunity for such northtransport costs by one-third northwestern and southwestern western and southwestern
over shipping by sea, also cities as Xi’an and Chengdu to
cities as Xi’an and Chengdu
extends south to the Chinese
to catch up in development
port city of Beihai, Guangxi catch up in development by
by
prioritising
transport
Province, from where the prioritising transport logistics.
logistics. This has further
cargo can be shipped to
benefited these major inteSingapore (also 3C) via
rior cities by allowing them to
rail-sea intermodal shipping. The China-Southeast Asia shift from “going east” to attract cargo from export-heavy
extended segment of this long route roughly aligns with coastal cities to “going west” by sending exports to Europe
the China-Indochina Peninsular Corridor of the BRI.
by the CEFT more cost-effectively.
These two exemplary routes reveal the crucial interFigure 2 also points to the critical role of four small
mediary role of key CEFT hubs in central and western Chinese border cities, Alashankou and Khorgos (Xinjiang)
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and Erlianhot and Manzhouli (Inner Mongolia),
expense in terms of reduced air and sea shipping
as exit/entry points that have turned a few
during the pandemic. During January-June 2021,
marginally located places into important gate7,377 CEFTs carried 707,000 TEUs, increases of
ways (2A) of the CEFT network. With the smallest
43% and 52% over the same period in 2020.7
As the CEFT has grown, it has run more
population of the four at less than 30,000,
balanced
directionally.
Alashankou
(Alataw
Prior to 2014, every train
Pass
or
Dzungarian
ran from China to Europe.
Gate), on the border
As
the
number
and
extent
of
these
But the return or backwith Kazakhstan, led all
haul trips began to grow
four cities in processing CEFT routes have multiplied, they
in 2016 and accounted
19,841 freight trains up to
for roughly one-third of
23 May 2021 since seeing have expanded the number of
all trips. Of the 3,673 trips
the very first train from departure, intermediate and arrival
Chongqing to Duisburg points across the four zones and thus in 2017, 1,225 (33.4%)
trains went from Europe
in 2011. Alashankou now
to China (Jakóbowski
links 22 CEFT lines from accelerated the growth of CEFTs.
et al. 2018). In 2018, the
a variety of cities across
2,690 eastbound trains
China to many cities
equalled 73% of the 3,670 westbound trains (Tjia
spread across 13 European and Central Asian
2020). To put it differently, the Europe-to-China
countries. In the first half of 2021, 3,033 trains
trains accounted for 42% of all trips. By another
carrying 288,300 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent
metric, while 94% of the westbound trains were
unit) containers passed through Alashankou,
fully loaded in 2018, 71% of the eastbound trains
representing 41.1% more trains and 48.6% more
carried a full load of containers. In 2019, eastfreight over the same period in 2020.5 The CEFT
has turned Alashankou and the other three
bound CEFT trains rose to 45% of the total in both
small border cities of China into new internadirections.8 This indicated an effective end of
the “one-way street” before 2014. Moreover, this
tional logistics hubs.
more balanced pattern has fostered extensions
As the number and extent of these CEFT
beyond the China-Europe and China-Central
routes have multiplied, they have expanded the
Asia connections, as indicated by the second
number of departure, intermediate and arrival
example above.
points across the four zones and thus accelerated
The CEFT’s wide connectivity and rapid
the growth of CEFTs. While there were only 17
growth has impacted the relative positions and
trips in 2011, the launch of the BRI in 2013 saw 80
roles of the cities involved in relation to the
trips, which rose to 308 in 2014. The number of
spatial dynamics of production and consumptrains jumped to 6,363 in 2018, almost equalling
tion across Eurasia. While some small and
the total number of trips for the previous seven
marginally located cities like Alashankou have
years. While the COVID-19 outbreak in China at
become specialised in border-clearing logisthe beginning of 2020 slowed the CEFT’s strong
tics, other second-tier or medium-sized cities
growth through 2019, the quick suppression of
have risen or revived to shape or redirect the
the virus halted the temporary slowdown and
geographical configuration and intersection of
accelerated growth through 2020. By year-end,
manufacturing supply chains and consumer
the 12,406 CEFT trips were 6.3 times those of 2016
goods flows within and across Europe and China,
and exceeded the record 2019 by 51%. The end of
with important local consequences. I illustrate
2020 saw the cumulative number of CEFT trips
this cross-boundary impact of the CEFT using
reach 33,600, which had carried almost three
the ancient Chinese city of Xi’an and the historic
million TEUs of traded goods, worth $160 billion.6
This accelerated growth occurred at some
river port of Duisburg, from their respective
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locations and in long-distance connection to
some other cities across Eurasia (Figure 2).

REDIRECTING PRODUCTION AND
CONSUMPTION: XI’AN
The eastern starting point of the ancient Silk
Road, Xi’an in Shaanxi Province, has been a
prominent historical, cultural and economic
centre in China for over two millennia. It served
as the capital for 13 dynasties. While much
better known for the Terracotta Soldiers than
its economic prowess, Xi’an became one of the
earliest cities in the world during the Han dynasty
(206 BC–220 AD) and Tang dynasty (618-907 AD),
the early and peak periods of the Silk Road.
Fast-forward to the contemporary era, Xi’an fell
behind its historic peers, such as Hangzhou and
Nanjing in the coastal region, and lagged further
behind coastal powerhouses like Shanghai and
Shenzhen. Shenzhen benefited particularly
from being the major destination for people and

companies that had left inland cities like Xi’an
in the 1980s. Xi’an has regained some of its lost
fortune since around 2000, after China’s “Go
West” policy and later the BRI. This favourable
turn for Xi’an, and other central and western
cities, positioned them well to use the CEFT as a
logistics strategy for catch-up development.
Xi’an’s logistics strategy began with the
construction of the Xi'an International Trade
and Logistics Park (ITLP) in 2008. The ITLP
comprised three integrated zonal functions:
1) the Xi’an Comprehensive Bonded Zone; 2)
the Xi’an rail container centre; and 3) the Xi’an
inland road port. In 2009, the ITLP established
and financed the Xi'an International Inland Port
Investment & Development Group (ITL Group)
as the ITLP’s operating arm. The ITL Group
launched the first train to Almaty, Kazakhstan
in 2013. From the outset, Xi’an idealised its
CEFT with a reimagination of its ancient Silk
Road position by invoking the metaphor of the
“Iron Silk Road”. The Xi’an government named
its CEFT after the old city name of “Chang’an
(Forever Peace) Express”, which was used for the

FIGURE 4: THE CHINA-EUROPE FREIGHT TRAIN “CHANG’AN EXPRESS” (XI’AN): THE CORPORATE IMAGE AND LOGO

Source: The China-Europe Freight Train “Chang’an Express” WeChat platform;
accessed from https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ie84R92W5hns3s4p_VJ0YA.
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9

CHINA AND THE WORLD

capital of several Chinese dynasties until it was renamed
Xi’an (Western Peace) in 1369. The “Chang’an Express”
also uses a fitting logo of three Bactrian camels walking
next to a speeding train (see image, figure 4). Riding on the
“Chang’an Express”, Xi’an rose to be a top-tier CEFT city in
a few short years. In 2020, 3,670 CEFTs left and returned to
Xi’an, ahead of Chengdu (2,800) and Chongqing (2,177) as
the second- and third-ranked cities (Figure 2), accounting
for almost one-third of China’s total number of CEFTs.9
Xi’an has reconfigured some transnational flows of
trade and production through its newly established logistics role. In September 2019, the ITL Group dispatched the
first “LG block train”, which carried exclusive liquid-crystal
display (LCD) panels and electrodes to the factory owned
by the large Korean manufacturer located in the Polish
city of Sławków. Instead of around 40 days by sea, these
containerised parts on a dedicated freight train arrived at
the destination in 10-12 days. Since 2019, LG has already
sent over 1,000 TEUs of parts to its factory in Sławków on
the “Chang’an Express”, after shipping them from Korea
to the Chinese port city of Qingdao and then to Xi’an for

Europe.10 Via this logistical path from 1A->2B->2A->3A->4A
(see Figure 2), which saves time and cost for LG, Xi’an has
effectively redirected a global supply chain from East Asia
via western China to central Europe.
Xi’an’s other logistical effect on production is more
direct, as its transnational freight connectivity has lured
more manufacturing companies to (re)locate locally in
order to ship products and parts to European markets more
quickly and cheaply. In 2018, the founder of Siying, an electronics manufacturing company in Shenzhen, originally
from Xi’an, moved his entire factory back to his home town
after realising that he could ship products to Central Asia
faster (from around 40 to around 15 days) to lower costs and
thus expand production. Since relocation, this company
has reduced the cycle of its order placement and supply
chain coordination from around 90 to 30-40 days, almost
tripled its output, hired more local workers, and expanded
its markets from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to France and
Germany. This relocation of manufacturing production
and faster shipping has involved a spatial movement of
1C->2B->2A->3A->4A (Figure 2).

FIGURE 5: VOLVO XC90 SUVS AND V40 HATCHBACKS ARRIVED AT XI'AN PORT FROM GHENT, BELGIUM ON JUNE 13, 2018

Source: China Daily photo;
accessed from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201806/15/WS5b2387b9a310010f8f59d39f.html.
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FIGURE 6: A FREIGHT TRAIN LOADED WITH XC 60 SUVS ARRIVED IN GHENT, BELGIUM FROM XI’AN ON JULY 4, 2019
Source: China Daily photo; accessed from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201907/08/WS5d22d625a3105895c2e7c40f_2.html.

Xi’an’s other logistical effect on
production is more direct, as its
transnational freight connectivity has
lured more manufacturing companies
to (re)locate locally in order to ship
products and parts to European
markets more quickly and cheaply.

Along with its impact on production, the
“Chang’an Express” has strengthened Xi’an’s
role in connecting and redistributing consumption across European and Chinese cities. For
example, Volvo has benefited greatly from
running a new regular train between Xi’an and
Ghent, Belgium. In June 2018, a CEFT train
departed from Ghent and arrived at Xi'an Vehicle
Port with 160 European-made Volvo XC90 SUVs
and V40 hatchbacks, after 16 days (see photo,
figure 5). These more expensive models sell
very well in China, the world’s largest market for
Volvo cars. In 2019, a “Chang’an Express” train
loaded with 160 XC60 SUVs arrived in Ghent,
Belgium after an 18-day journey. Made at Volvo's
plant in Chengdu, China, the XC60 were sold in
25 European countries, including France and

Germany.11 During the first three months of
2020, when China was seeing off the pandemic,
27 trains from Xi’an carried 3,377 XC60s (averaging 125 cars per block train) to the European
markets through a fast and secure system from
truck to train, without exposing the new cars
to potential virus contamination (see photo,
figure 6).12 While involving Central Asia only as
the pass-through space, this bidirectional transportation and consumption of Volvo cars flows
through zones 1-4 (Figure 2).
From its geometrical central location in
China, Xi’an has channelled imported consumer
goods within and beyond China. In 2020, more
than 20 provinces, with uneven access to overland exports, used the “Chang’an Express” to
export and import their goods by means of
consolidation and redistribution via Xi’an. More
than half of the imported goods for Shaanxi
province passed through Xi’an, which also
moved over 70% of these goods to the rest of
China.13 The “Chang’an Express” has brought
such popular European imports as Dutch dairy
products, French cosmetics, Georgian red
wine, Italian clothing and Norwegian salmon
to Chinese consumers. As China has become
an even bigger consumer, whose share of global
consumption rose from 9% during 2000-5 to 23%
during 2013-18 (McKinsey & Company 2021),
Chinese consumers have been buying more
imported consumer goods, especially luxury

www.europeanfinancialreview.com
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FIGURE 7: THE HISTORIC ENTREPÔT RIVER PORT WITH RAILWAY/ROAD
(AUTOBAHNS) CONNECTIONS ON THE RHINE RIVER, DUISBURG, GERMANY
Source: Taken by author in July, 2016.

European brands, with over half of this spending
from second- or lower-tier interior cities, led by
cities like Xi’an.14 This bodes well for Xi’an to
continue its role in stimulating local consumption and spreading national consumption of
global imports carried by its “Chang’an Express”.

RENEWING URBAN
DEVELOPMENT: DUISBURG
While Xi’an is a good example of reviving itself
through building up the ITLP and operating the
“Chang’an Express”, I turn to Duisburg as a more
compelling case where a deindustrialised city
has renewed itself as Europe’s most important
logistics hub for the CEFT.
As the world’s largest inland port, at the intersection of the Rhine and Ruhr rivers in central
Germany, Duisburg has a strategic locational
advantage in receiving freight trains from China
and trans-shipping their cargo to other parts of
Europe by river, highway and rail. A river port
for over three centuries (since 1716) and once a
dominant coal-mining and steel-making centre
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in Germany’s industrial heartland of the Ruhr
region, Duisburg has lost much of its manufacturing base since the 1960s with a weak economy
and high unemployment, which stood at 11%
compared with the average unemployment of
3% across Germany.15 In 1982, Duisburg became
a sister city to the Chinese city of Wuhan,
although it had not done very much with China
before 2011. Wuhan is similar to Duisburg
economically, as a steel-making centre on the
Yangtze River and also a CEFT hub today, similar
to Xi’an (see Figures 1 and 2). The 1980s also
saw Duisburg build up its inland port facilities.
In 1993, Duisburg combined the harbours of
Duisburg and Ruhrort and created the modern
logistics hub of Duisport, although it continued
to suffer from a broader decline due to industrial
restructuring in the Ruhr region and Germany
as a whole. This suppressed Duisburg’s build-up
and greater logistics capacities, leading to two
decades of “relative stagnation” until 2011,16
when it began to receive a growing number of
CEFTs from China.
Duisburg now receives four out of five trains
every day from China as their first European
stop, averaging about 35-40 arrivals each week.

This large freight cargo flow into Duisburg has
produced an agglomerated effect through the
expanded and clustered activities in customs
clearance, bonded warehousing, loading and
other areas of intermodal trans-shipping at and
from the river and rail terminals (see photo,
figure 7). Duisport’s CEO noted that its employment has grown from 19,000 to 50,000.17 This
has also created new opportunities for more
Chinese companies, numbering over 100, to set
up shop in Duisburg, which in turn contributes
further to the local economy. It is estimated
that the combination of the CEFT cargo and
other Chinese investment account for about
15% of Duisburg’s employment. The infusion of
Chinese goods, capital and personnel has turned
Duisburg from a traditional river port for local
trade into a more expansive continental logistics
centre capable of diffusing economic influence
across Central and Eastern Europe through the
multimodal distribution of cargo flows.18
Besides the measurable economic impact
in Duisburg, the city’s growing ties with China
through and beyond the CEFT have brought
about other positive local changes. About
2,000 Chinese students currently study at the
University of Duisburg-Essen. Max Planck
High School in Duisburg has become a leader
in teaching Chinese. “The trend is clear: we
must work together with China,” said principal
Gabriele Rüken. To that end, she decided that as
of 2020, students at her school would be able to
start learning Chinese from their seventh year,
alongside French and English. This educational
initiative can help Germans better understand
China and be prepared to deal with this global
economic power with a long reach.19 On 14 April
2020, the first train for Europe from Wuhan
arrived in Duisburg with large amounts of PPE,
which reinforced the long-standing, long-distance sister-city relationship between the two
cities. Now known as Germany’s “China City”,
Duisburg has not only largely revived its eroded
economy by becoming Europe’s central CEFT
hub, but also created a broader foundation for
more sustainable development and prosperity
through logistical multipliers.

FROM CONNECTIVITY TO
SUSTAINABILITY
Looking out from Xi’an and Duisburg as
main CEFT hubs, the CEFT’s ever-expanding
trans-border spaces (Figure 2) appear to be
geographically confined and finite due to a
variety of economic, spatial and market conditions, such as basic demand and passable
topography, etc. The actual scope and edge of
the CEFT’s connectivity, however, have been
pushed further out toward unfamiliar territories and through more complicated intermodal
extensions. This alerts us to consider where the
most recent CEFT routes may lead and the additional actors and places involved.

As the world’s largest inland port,
at the intersection of the Rhine
and Ruhr rivers in central Germany,
Duisburg has a strategic locational
advantage in receiving freight
trains from China and transshipping their cargo to other parts
of Europe by river, highway and rail.
On 24 July 2020, a freight train left Xi’an,
travelling north via Erlianhot into Mongolia,
through Russia and Minsk, Belarus, and then
ran south past the town of Mostyska near the
Ukrainian-Polish border, before arriving in
Kiev. This became possible through cooperation
between the Polish logistics company PCC and
the Ukrainian company Global Ocean Link. They
took advantage of the CEFT’s rapid expansion and
Ukraine as the EU’s largest trading partner, with
their bilateral trade having grown 10-15% during
2014-19.20 On 28 June 2021, the first-ever freight
train travelled from Xi’an through Kazakhstan,
Russia, Poland and Germany, before arriving in
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Paris after 18 days. From Paris, some cargo was
transported to the port of Marseilles, and then
shipped to Algeria, Morocco and Tunis by sea
(2B->2A->3A->4A->4C). This is faster than going
through Duisburg and then to either Hamburg
by water or any of the Mediterranean ports by
truck for shipping to North Africa, reaching the
edge of the CEFT’s conventional boundaries
(Figure 2) via intermodal trans-shipment.
In November 2019, a “Chang’an Express” train
left Xi’an, went through Kazakhstan and Baku,
Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea, passed the
Georgian capital of Tbilisi and then the Turkish
capital of Ankara, through the Marmaray
tunnel below the Bosphorus Strait in Istanbul,
and eventually arrived in Prague. It marked a
rare land-sea-land intermodal run along the
CEFT’s south channel or middle corridor (see
Figure 1). This new line gained more use in
early 2021, when the inaugural return train
from Istanbul arrived in Xi’an after 15 days and
thus launched the bidirectional Xi’an-Istanbul

service (2B<->2A<->3A<->4B). Back in August
2016, Jiangsu Qingeng Industrial Co. and
companies from Afghanistan jointly launched a
freight train from the city of Nantong (Jiangsu
Province), near Shanghai, to Afghanistan. The
trip took 15 days to complete and passed through
Alashankou, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan before
arriving at the land border port of Hairatan
(Mazar-i-Sharif ) in northern Afghanistan.21 A
freight train returned along the same route in
2019 (see photo, figure 8). A rare China-Asia
freight connection (1B<->2A<->3A<->3B), this
difficult route to a risky destination heralds a
potential new opportunity for China to engage
with Afghanistan economically and logistically
with the departure of the United States military.
As the CEFT connects more cities over
wider geographies and longer distances, it has
involved more diverse and competing players,
most of which are local municipal governments,
their subordinate entities and private logistics
firms (see above), as well as their partnerships.

FIGURE 8: A TRAIN LOADED WITH AFGHAN GOODS HEADS TO NANTONG, CHINA IN SEPTEMBER, 2019
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Source: https://www.railfreight.com/beltandroad
/2019/09/17/afghan-train-to-china-is-a-fact.

The ITL Group worked with DHL in November
government of China issued a plan to consolidate
2019 to launch the “German Express” from Xi’an
the CEFT hub functions in five major cities, Xi’an,
to Hamburg and Neuss, another logistics hub on
Chengdu, Chongqing, Urumqi, and Zhengzhou
the Rhine river, like Duisburg. The ITL Group
(Henan Province), which accounted for 63%
has also cooperated with Deutsche Bahn (DB)
of all CEFTs in the first half of 2021. This was a
in using the “German Express” to add a service
corrective measure to reduce the inefficiency
to Vilnius, Lithuania. In
cause by over-competition
March 2019, the ITL Group
and duplication among
The
CEFT’s
expansion
and
got Nippon Express, a top
many cities. It reflects the
global logistics firm from sustainability will benefit from being national
government’s
Japan, to lure its clients
effort to catch up with local
like Olympus and Honda the critical middle option of longauthorities and actors in
to use the “Chang’an distance freight transport that is
developing and operating
Express”
for
shipping faster than sea and cheaper than air.
the CEFT by introducing
their exports from Xi’an
a national vision and form
to Europe (1A->2B->2Aof support. This is further
>3A->4A, Figure 2). This goes along with Xi’an’s
exemplified by the national government’s requiregreater role in adding air and sea extensions,
ment that subnational governments’ subsidies,
which accounted for 40% of the “Chang’an
including by Xi’an, for CEFT cargo trains should
Express’s” new business during the initial peak
not exceed 50% of domestic railway costs and be
of the pandemic in early 2020.
reduced by 10% a year compared to the 50% level
From the European end, for example, the ÖBB
in 2018, with the prospect that all subsidies will
Rail Cargo Group (RCG), a leading rail logistics
be phased out by 2022.24
From the more collective and fragmented
company in Austria, entered the CEFT market
European end, the EU’s two-decade-old Transin 2017, when it operated only 62 trains with a
European Transport Network (TEN-T), which
transport capacity of 3,000 TEUs. Due to stronger
includes hundreds of air, rail, road and port
demand, RCG transported 35,000 TEUs between
projects to strengthen the cohesion, interconnecEurope and Asia in both 2018 and 2019. In 2020,
tion and interoperability of the trans-European
it set a new record of over 700 trains with around
transport network by 2030, appears to dovetail
70,000 TEUs.23 As one of the EU’s only four landlocked countries, Austria stands to benefit from
with the CEFT and the BRI. In reality, however,
a stronger connection to the CEFT driven by RCG
the TEN-T and the CEFT have not formally “met”
and its strong focus on creating and connecting
through any direct dialogue and cooperation.
the Eurasian freight routes through Russia.
In another complication, it is unclear how the
Through the growing participation via both
CEFT will interact with the EU’s “Connecting
competition and collaboration between private
Europe and Asia – Building blocks for an EU”
and public logistics companies from Europe,
strategy, introduced in September 2018. A new
China and East Asia, the CEFT has introduced
challenge to coordinate with the CEFT comes
more market efficiency into this vast crossfrom the most recent EU initiative – “Globally
border logistics system. The CEFT-led initiatives
Connected Europe” -- which seems designed
by cities like Xi’an and Duisburg have driven the
to counter the BRI, and by extension the CEFT,
larger number of freight lines from below. To
by coordinating and promoting investments in
sustain the CEFT for the long run, the private
infrastructure projects to link Europe with the
sector and local government need to interface
world from 2022. At the national level, however,
with the national governments and even supranaGermany has more of its cities involved with
tional agencies of China, Europe and Asia more
the CEFT than any other EU member state, also
broadly. In July 2020, the most top-heavy national
evidenced by its discharging the second-largest
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number of TEUs from East Asia, including by sea, behind
only Britain before it left the EU. It isn’t just coincidence
that the departing German Chancellor Merkel has consistently taken the most pro-China stance among the major EU
members, and also relative to the United States.
Finally, the CEFT faces a greater challenge in raising
its share of carrying the China-EU trade cargo, especially
against the dominant sea shipping. In 2018, the CEFT
accounted for only 2.3% of China’s exports to Europe and
3.1% of China’s imports from Europe, while about 90% of
China-Europe trade by weight and 60% by value went by sea
(Tjia 2020). Aided by a shift of maritime cargo to overland
rail shipping due to the pandemic, the share in Europe’s
total imports from China by train rose from <1% in 2011 to
4% in 2020. The EU-China trade volume on rail more than
doubled, with annual growth of 26.9% from 2016 to 2020.25
Yet the 1,135,000 TEUs carried by the CEFTs in 2020 only
equalled 2.6% of all the TEUs handled by Shanghai Port,26
which is not surprising given the structural cost and scale
advantages of sea shipping.
As trade continues to grow between China and the
EU, as each other’s largest and second-largest trading
partners respectively, the CEFT is poised to grow with it.
This looks more promising as the CEFT consolidates its
recently launched routes into round trips and to regular
schedules, such as the new Xi’an-Istanbul line and a new
Xi’an-Budapest line via Ukraine. It will help translate the
CEFT-related dots and lines on the Eurasian transport
map into a more formal and resilient network carrying
a steadily growing share of the China-Europe and ChinaCentral Asia trade cargo. The CEFT’s expansion and
sustainability will benefit from being the critical middle
option of long-distance freight transport that is faster
than sea and cheaper than air. This bodes well for the
CEFT to run not only more connected across Eurasia but
also more sustainably into the future.
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